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Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the
European Union
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Christiana HTI Panayi

1. Introduction
W hilst treaty shopping is not a new phenomenon, it remains as controver
sial as ever. It would seem that the more countries try to deal with it, the
wider the disagreements as to what is improper treaty shopping and what is
legitimate tax planning.
In this paper, we reassess the traditional quasi-definitions of treaty shop
ping in an attempt to delineate the contours of such practices. We examine
the various theoretical arguments advanced to justify the campaign against
treaty shopping.
We also consider the current trends in treaty shopping and the anti-treaty
shopping policies under the OECD Model and the US Model. We focus
on recent cases on beneficial ownership. Finally, we examine the possible
implications of EU law on the treaty shopping debate.

2. Treaty shopping and improper use of tax treaties
2.1. Finding the contours of treaty shopping
The term "treaty shopping" is thought to have originated in the United
States. The analogy was drawn with the term "forum shopping", which
described the situation in US civil procedure whereby a litigant tried to
"shop" between jurisdictions in which he expected a more favourable
decision to be rendered.1 David Rosenbloom, who served as International
Tax Counsel in the US Treasury Department during 1977-198 1, described
the phenomenon as "the practice of some investors of 'borrowing' a tax
treaty by forming an entity (usually a corporation) in a country having a
favourable tax treaty with the country of source -that is, the country where

1.
Becker, H. and F.J. Wiirm, Treaty Shopping: An Emerging Tax Issue and its
Present Status in Various Countries (Deventer: Kluwer, 1988), p. 2.
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the investment is to be made and the income in question is to be eamed".2 In
other words, a person "shops" into an otherwise unavailable treaty through
complicated structures; hence the term "treaty shopping".3
The term "treaty shopping" has never featured in any versions of the
OECD Model. Nor has it been properly defined or explained in the OECD
Commentary. Rather, the emphasis is always on eliminating treaty shop
ping and the measures that can be taken against it. Most of the references to
treaty shopping are references by default; i.e. when discussing anti-treaty
shopping provisions. For example, references to the "problem commonly
referred to as 'treaty-shopping"'4 are made for the first time in the OECD
Commentary on Art. 1, when discussing Limitation-of-Benefits (LOB) pro
visions and how these provisions are meant "to address the issue [of treaty
shopping] in a comprehensive way".5 A description of treaty shopping is
given indirectly and in very general terms. It is stated that LOB provisions
are there to address treaty shopping. Then it is stated that LOB provisions
are "aimed at preventing persons who are not residents of either Contract
ing States from accessing the benefits of a Convention through the use of
an entity that would otherwise qualify as a resident of one of these States".6
Treaty shopping features in a similarly elusive way in the new Technical Expla
nation to the 2006 US Model? The term "treaty shopping" is used in the Tech
nical Explanation when describing the function of anti-treaty-shopping pro
visions. 8 The new Technical Explanation to the Limitation on Benefits clause

2.
Rosenbloom, D., "Derivative Benefits: Emerging US Treaty Policy", 22 Intertax 2 (1994), p. 83.
3.
The concept was traced back to the early 1970s at the US Congressional Hearings
on Offshore Tax Havens. See US Congress, Offshore Tax Havens, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 96th Congr. I st
Session ( 1 977) and Rosenbloom, D., "Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues", 1 5 Law &
Pol'y Int'l Bus. (1983), p. 763.
4.
2008 OECD Commentary to Art. I, Para. 20.
5.
Id.
Id.
6.
7.
The phrase "improper use of tax treaties" is not used anywhere in the Technical
Explanation to the 2006 US Model. Neither was it used in the Technical Explanation to
the 1996 US Model.
8.
2006 Technical Explanation, p. 63. Contrast with the Technical Explanation to the
1 996 US Model where it is stated that "[a] treaty that provides treaty benefits to any resi
dent of a Contracting State permits 'treaty-shopping': the use, by residents of third states,
of legal entities established in a Contracting State with a principal purpose to obtain the
benefits of a tax treaty between the United States and the other Contracting State". The
1996 Technical Explanation emphasised that this definition "does not encompass every
case in which a third state resident establishes an entity in a US treaty partner, and that
entity enjoys treaty benefits to which the third state resident would not itself be entitled.
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found in Art. 22 states that this article "contains anti-treaty-shopping provisions
that are intended to prevent residents of third countries from benefiting from
what is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries".
If one looks at the quasi-definitions of treaty shopping, what one notes is that

the term "treaty shopping", as used, may encompass a broad spectrum of struc
tures, ranging from the purely abusive and artificial ones to others with more
substance. However, are all these instances of improper use of tax treaties?
The OECD Commentary seems to perpetuate this confusion. The descriptions
given in Paras. 9 and 20 of the OECD Commentary to Art. 1 would seem
to catch general forms of treaty shopping; i.e. treaty shopping without tax
haven or conduit connotations. However, the examples given in Para. 1 1 of
the Commentary would seem to catch treaty shopping of a more specific and
abusive nature; i.e. treaty shopping through conduits and/or base companies.
Therefore, there are the two obvious ends of the spectrum: treaty shopping
through conduits and bona fide commercial structures. The typical scenario
of treaty shopping through conduits, as also described in the OECD Conduit
Companies Report, is the following.
State S
No P·S benefits,
restricted benefits
Treaty reduces or eliminates

under tax treaty S/P

State S withholding taxes

State P

I Company PI

No domestic
tax in State R
on Company
Treaty reduces or eliminates State

R withholding taxes

R due to
special tax

L-_______, regime

A holding Company R would be organized in a State R that has beneficial
tax provisions both with a State S where a subsidiary Company S is located
and with a State P where its parent Company P is located. Company R
would typically be controlled by Company P and Company S would itself
be controlled by Company R.

If the third country resident had substantial reasons for establishing the structure that
were unrelated to obtaining treaty benefits, the structure would not fall within the defini
tion of treaty-shopping."
23
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If the income from Company S is paid directly to Company P, it is sub
ject to State S withholding tax with very few (if any) treaty benefits. The
income to Company P is, however, tax exempt (or receives beneficial tax
treatment) if channelled through Company R. This may be, if the income is
in the form of dividends, by virtue of a parent-subsidiary regime under the
domestic law of State R or a participation exemption or due to a convention
between States S and R. This is the obvious case where there is minimal or
zero other activity.
Therefore, treaty shopping of a clearly improper nature would entail the
following:
the beneficial owner (Company P) of the treaty shopping entity
(Company S) does not reside in the country where the entity is created;
the interposed company (Company R) has minimal economic activity
in the jurisdiction in which it is located; and
the income is subject to minimal (if any) tax in the country of residence
of the interposed company.
There could be many variations of this structure. For example, it may be
possible to use more than one tax treaty and move the funds through several
countries, in the process of which, the funds may change their character
(e.g. dividends transformed to interest).9
However, as already mentioned, this is only one end of the spectrum.
A treaty shopping structure could be imbued by different degrees of artifi
ciality. The intermediary company could be a complete sham or could have
some de minimis economic substance or the arrangement could be a bona
fide commercial nature.10 Surely, not all instances of third-country residents
benefitting from tax treaties to which their own countries are not privy are
examples of improper use.
Whilst one may more readily distinguish a complete sham from a bona fide
commercial arrangement - not always easy, as it depends on the jurisdic
tional perspectives on tax planning - the disputes (and litigation) usually

9.
For a description of various treaty-shopping arrangements, see OECD Conduit
Companies Report in OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD, International
Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Four Related Studies, Double Taxation Conventions and the
Use of Conduit Companies, Issues in International Taxation Series, No. 1 (Paris: OECD,
1987), (hereafter: OECD Conduit Companies Report).
10.
For further analysis, see HJI Panayi, C., Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty
Shopping and the European Community , EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation,
Vol. 1 5 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2007), Chapters 2 and 5.
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relate to the borderline cases. Successive Models and Commentaries have
done little to clarify the confusion. In fact, they seem to perpetuate it. This
may be deliberate. It is certainly to the advantage of the tax authorities to
have discretion to determine on an ad hoc basis what is improper treaty
shopping and what is legitimate tax planning.
It also seems that the traditional theoretical objections to treaty shopping do
not make a more convincing case. Nor are they targeted against wholly arti
ficial arrangements. This has important implications on how treaty shop
ping is tackled in various jurisdictions.

2.2. Theoretical objections to treaty shopping

Treaty shopping is, arguably, an instrument of international tax plan
ning. What is it about this kind of tax planning that makes it objection
able? A number of arguments have been advanced in the international tax
community. 1 1
Firstly, i t has been argued that treaty shopping i s an instance of tax avoid
ance and as such improper and contrary to the purposes of tax treaties.
It has also been argued that treaty shopping breaches the reciprocity of
a treaty and alters the balance of concessions attained therein between
the two contracting states.12 When a third-country resident "shops" into a

See, inter alios, Rosenbloom, D. and S. Langbein, "United States Tax Treaty
1 1.
Policy: An Overview", 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law ( 198 1 ), p. 359; Rosenbloom,
D., 15 Law & Pol'y lnt'l Bus. ( 1 983), p. 763; Becker and Wiirm, Treaty Shopping: An
Emerging Tax Issue and its Present Status in Various Countries ( 1988); van Weeghel,
S., T he Improper Use of Tax Treaties , Series on International Taxation, No. 19 (London,
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998); Reinhold, R.L., "What is Tax Treaty Abuse?
(Is Treaty Shopping an Outdated Concept?)", 53 Tax Lawyer 3 (2000), p. 663; Grady,
K.A., "Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of Prevention Techniques", 5 Nw.
J. lnt'l L. & Bus. (1983-4), p. 626; Roin, J.A., "Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strate
gic World with Disparate Tax Systems", 8 1 Virginia Law Review 7 ( 1 995), p. 1 753;
Loengard, R.O. Jr., "Foreign Investors and Nimble Capital: Another Look at the U.S.
Policy Towards Treaty Shopping", Tax Forum 439 ( 1 988), pp. 25-26; Streng, W.P.,
"Treaty Shopping: Tax Treaty Limitation of Benefits Issues", 15 Houston Journal of
International Law 1 ( 1992), pp. 1 -66; Terr, L.O., "Treaty Routing v. Treaty Shopping:
Planning for multi-country investment flows under modem limitation on benefits
articles", 17 lntertax 12 ( 1989), p. 521 .
12.
This argument has been produced in both the OECD Report on Conduit Compa
nies (Para. 7(a)) and the UN Report on the Prevention of Abuse of Tax Treaties. OECD
Conduit Companies Report, Para. 7(a); UN Department of International Economic and
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treaty, then the treaty concessions are extended to a resident, whose state
has not participated in this arrangement and may not reciprocate with cor
responding benefits (e.g. exchange of information). The usual quid pro quo
of the treaty is therefore compromised and the process subverted.
Another argument is based on the principle of economic allegiance. Pursu
ant to economic allegiance, a taxable base is attributable to the jurisdiction
in which it is thought to owe its economic existence. Tax treaties are pre
mised on the allocation of taxing rights according to this principle. Treaty
concessions are of a personal nature and are not to be extended to third
country residents. As a result of treaty shopping, the third country gains
revenue power, absent of any (substantial) claim to economic allegiance. 13
Furthermore, it is often claimed that treaty shopping creates a disincentive
for countries to negotiate tax treaties. If third countries can get the ben
efits of reduced taxation for their residents without conferring reciprocal
benefits to non-resident investors, then there is no need to enter into a tax
treaty, especially if there are concerns that the tax treaty might be imbal
anced.14 This may put countries which comply with their duties of fiscal
co-operation arising through tax treaties (e.g. exchange of information),
at a competitive disadvantage internationally. Furthermore, lack of fiscal
co-operation enhances opportunities for international tax evasion.15
Finally, it is argued that treaty shopping is often linked with (undesired)
revenue loss.16 Tax treaties are based on a perceived level of balance of
actual and potential income and capital flows between one country and the
other.17 When the benefits of the given treaty are abused, the level and bal
ance of these flows are distorted, with a resulting distortion in the share of
the relevant chargeable income channelled to each state. Treaty shopping
expands the normal bilateral relationship of the treaty. A generous treaty

Social Affairs, Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters,
Contributions to international co-operation in tax matters: treaty shopping, thin
capitalization, co-operation between tax authorities, resolving international tax disputes
(New York: United Nations, 1988) UN Doc. ST/EA/203, UN Sales No. E.88.XVI, p. 6
(hereafter: UN-Report ( 1 988)).
13.
Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law ( 198 1 ), pp. 359,
397-8.
14.
Conduit Companies Report, Para. 7 (c); Becker and Wiirm, Treaty Shopping
( 1988), p. 6; Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law (1981), p. 676.
15.
Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law ( 1981), pp. 396-397.
16.
Also see Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law (198 1),
p. 84.
1 7.
UN Report (1988), p. 6.
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with one trading partner becomes a treaty with the world. 18 This de facto
multilateralization of the tax treaty is thought to entail a large and indeter
minate cost to the source country. 19
As for the first argument, it is never an easy task to distinguish between
(international) tax avoidance and legitimate tax planning. What is it about
treaty shopping that makes it an instance of the former rather than the
latter? Why is it assumed that all forms of treaty shopping, irrespective of
their degree of artificiality, constitute tax avoidance?
As already mentioned, not all treaty shopping structures can be charac
terized as artificial and devoid of economic substance. The term "treaty
shopping", applied generically, may encompass a variety of structures. It
could encompass structures in which the intermediary company imposed
is a pure conduit with no economic substance whatsoever, completely
owned and controlled by the parent company and based in a notorious
conduit location or tax haven. However, this is only one end of the spec
trum. There is also the other end, where the intermediary company is a
company with some substance, conducting its own trading activities, not
controlled by the parent company and liable to some tax in the country of
residence. It should always be remembered that an arrangement may be
imbued with some economic substance that is not immediately apparent
to the tax authorities.
As for the reciprocity argument, although persuasive, it is premised on the
assumption that there is always reciprocity and/or for every treaty benefit.
This may not always be the case. Some treaty concessions may be unilat
eral if the other contracting state already provides for them in its domestic
legislation. Also, whilst there might be reciprocity in the tax treaty, it is
not guaranteed that the underlying balance of the treaty is a fair one. A tax
treaty may be biased in favour of the economically more powerful country.
Therefore, breaching reciprocity may not necessarily mean that a "fair"
balance has become "unfair". lt is the negotiated balance that is being sub
verted; whatever the fairness credentials of this balance.
As for the economic allegiance argument, this seems to be tautological.
Opinions diverge as to the defining characteristics of economic allegiance;
in other words, what kind of nexus is required for the duty of economic

18.
See US Treasury Department's June 27 1979 New Release B-1694 relating to the
US treaty with the Netherlands Antilles.
19.
Rosenbloom, 22 Intertax 2 ( 1 994), p. 84.
27
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allegiance to be generated in favour of a jurisdiction. Even if the principle
of economic allegiance was agreed upon, there are no guarantees that coun
tries negotiating tax treaties would follow it. In any case, it should not be
readily assumed that all instances of treaty shopping fall foul of the prin
ciple of economic allegiance. Some treaty shopping arrangements might
be more abusive than others, for example, where the conduit country is a
tax haven or where the conduit company has no other activity other than
channelling payments to parent companies. In such instances, the principle
is flagrantly breached as there is no economic activity whatsoever taking
place in the conduit country that could justify the latter's claim of economic
allegiance.
As for the disincentive-to-negotiate argument, in assessing the potency
of this argument, the self-correcting forces of competition and the inter
national economic pressure for fiscal convergence should not be ignored.
Also, it should be pointed out that the competitiveness of foreign inves
tors can still be preserved by their country of residence if double taxa
tion is relieved through unilateral means. What is more, it is all too often
assumed that treaty shopping disincentivizes the third country from enter
ing into tax treaties and that the source country wants tax treaties. In
some cases the source country might not want a tax treaty with the third
country, for example, if the third country is a tax haven or a notorious
conduit location.
This is, however, a valid argument. Even if double taxation can be allevi
ated by unilateral means, there are some reciprocal advantages which can
only or more easily be achieved through tax treaties (e.g. provisions dealing
with pensions, students, artists, dispute resolution). Tax treaty networks
ensure that fiscal collaboration between the contracting states is strength
ened and adapted to new forms of tax evasion and avoidance.
Therefore, the concern that treaty shopping creates a disincentive to
negotiate tax treaties is a valid one, if treaties are entered into for the right
reasons- that is to keep the momentum for international fiscal convergence
and co-operation rather than enable one country to bully another into tax
concessions.
As for the revenue-loss argument, again, there is no concrete evidence that
treaty shopping actually causes revenue loss and economic distortions.
Firstly, it is not easy to calculate the benefits and costs of a tax treaty to
a contracting state. A contracting state might be both a country of resi
dence and a country of source and enjoy benefits or bear costs under both
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capacities.20 Therefore, finding the costs and benefits that a contracting
state derives from a tax treaty entails quite complex calculations for which
there might not be concurrence. 21 Some of the benefits, for example mutual
assistance, cannot really be translated in monetary terms.
Secondly, why is there a presumption of a loss? It could be argued that
when treaty shopping increases economic activity, the overall economic
gain might exceed source-country losses.22 This begs the question. When
does treaty shopping increase economic activity and when does it not?
Does it depend on whether the source country is a developing country?
For example, in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan,23 the Indian
Supreme Court refused to imply an anti-treaty-shopping clause in the
India-Mauritius tax treaty. In the judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized
that in developing countries, treaty shopping was often regarded as a tax
incentive to attract scarce foreign capital or technology. "Developing
countries need foreign investments, and the treaty shopping opportunities
can be an additional factor to attract them".24 Countries had to take a holistic
view. "The developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage capital
and technology inflows, which developed countries are keen to provide to
them. The loss of tax revenues could be insignificant compared to the other
non-tax benefits to their economy. Many of them do not appear to be too
concerned unless the revenue losses are significant compared to the other
tax and non-tax benefits from the treaty, or the treaty shopping leads to
other tax abuses."25 Treaty shopping may be a necessary evil, tolerated in a
developing economy, in the interest of long-term development.26
Therefore, it ought not to be assumed that treaty shopping always leads to
losses - in the medium or long term. The loss of tax revenues as a result
of treaty shopping could be insignificant compared to the other non-tax

20.
Van Weeghel, S., The Improper Use of Tax Treaties (1998), p. 122.
21.
Even the same authors may reach inconsistent conclusions in subsequent reports.
See, for example, Blonigen, B.A. and R.B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on
US FDI Activity, NBER Working Paper No. 7929, (Cambridge: NBER, 2000); Blonigen,
B.A. and R.B. Davies, Do Bilateral Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment, NBER
Working Paper No. 8834, (Cambridge: NBER, 2002).
22.
Bracewell-Milnes, B., Economics of International Tax Avoidance (Deventer:
Kluwer, 1 980), p. 23.
23.
Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan [2003] 6 1TLR 233; (2003) SOL 6 19. For
some commentary, see Baistrocchi, E., "The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the
Emerging World: Theory and Implications", British Tax Review 4 (2008), p. 352.
24.
ld., p. 280.
25.
ld., p. 28 1 .
26.
ld.
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benefits generated in the economy as a result of the influx of capital and
technology. An argument based on revenue loss and economic distortions
should factor this in.
Thirdly, absent a truly neutral tax system, it is difficult to assess any distor
tions caused by treaty shopping. In fact, it could be argued that the inherent
non-neutralities of tax systems create an incentive to treaty shop. In other
words, treaties generate treaty shopping.27 Treaty shopping is perhaps a
self-help way of lessening or removing fiscal impediments to international
business imposed by the inadequate relief of international double taxation
and the incomplete nature of the treaty network.
Hence, so far, we see (deliberately) inadequate definitions and theoretical
objections which are somewhat detached from reality. This would go some
way in explaining the responses to treaty shopping.

3. Responses to treaty shopping: The OECD and the

United States
In this section, we examine how the OECD and the United States have dealt
with treaty shopping.

3 1. The OECD approach to treaty shopping

Some basic methods of curbing treaty shopping practices existed ever since
the 1977 OECD Model: the beneficial ownership and the limitation on
residence provisions. In the OECD Conduit Companies Report, the Fiscal
Affairs Committee recognized the deficiencies of these basic methods28 and
conceded that the 1 977 Model dealt with conduits in a rudimentary way,
"expressing only a general concern that improper use of treaties should be
avoided".29 Other more specific measures were suggested.30 The underly
ing theme of these measures was that treaty benefits should be available
only to entities having a sufficient nexus with the country of residence,

2 7.
Avery Jones, J.F., "The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: 'Are tax treaties necessary?"',
53 Tax Law Review 1 (1999), pp. 3-8; Spence, 1., "Globalisation of Transnational Busi
ness: The Challenge for International Tax Policy", 25 /ntertax 4 (1997), pp. 143-144.
2 8.
OECD Conduit Companies Report, Paras. 13-15.
2 9.
Id., Para. 15.
30.
Id., Para. 10.
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either because of direct or indirect ownership of the entity or because of the
economic ties between the entity and the treaty country.
These suggestions were subsequently incorporated in the 1992 Commen
tary to Art. 1 and updated in the 2003 Commentary following the 2002
OECD Report on Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits. There have
been no further amendments in the 2008 update to the OECD Commen
tary. The current OECD Commentary still does not offer a uniform solution
for tackling improper use. However, it sets out the solutions, as suggested
benchmarks that treaty negotiators might consider when searching for a
solution to specific cases. These are the beneficial ownership approach,31
the look-through approach,32 the channel approach,33 the limitation on

31.
The beneficial ownership provision which is found in Arts. 10 to 12 of the
OECD Model precludes the extension of specific treaty benefits to entities which are
not beneficial owners of the particular income, even if they are formal recipients of it.
Neither the OECD Model nor its Commentary gives a definition of the term "beneficial
owner". However, a substance over form approach is preferred.
32.
Look-through clauses focus on direct and indirect ownership of the entity. The
typical wording of the clause reads as follows:
"A company that is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to relief from
taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of income, gains or profits if it
is owned or controlled directly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, by
persons who are not residents of a Contracting State." (OECD Commentary, Para. 14);
It is up to the contracting states to agree on the criteria according to which a company
would be considered to be owned or controlled by non-residents.
33.
The channel approach, also called base erosion, seeks to catch intermediary enti
ties whose tax base is eroded in favour of third-country residents (usually controlling
shareholders or associated persons) through the payment of interest or royalties or by the
discharge of obligations. The typical wording of a channel clause reads as follows:
"Where income arising in a Contracting State is received by a company resident of the other
Contracting State and one or more persons not resident in that other Contracting State:
( 1 ) have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident,
a substantial interest in such company, in the form of a participation or otherwise, and
(2) exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the management or control of such
company, any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a reduction
of, tax shall not apply if more than 50 per cent of such income is used to satisfy claims
by such persons (including interest, royalties, development, advertising, initial and travel
expenses, depreciation of any kind of business assets including those on immaterial
goods, processes etc)."
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residence approach,34 the exclusion approach35 and the subject-to-tax
approach36•
The first three methods focus on the ownership of the intermediary entity
and its relationship with the actual recipient of the payment. Their aim is to
ensure that that tax treaty benefits are forfeited when the formal recipient
of the income is not actually entitled to the income or the income will most
certainly be passed on to a third-country resident. The last three methods
focus on taxation in the country of residence. Their aim is to ensure that tax
treaty benefits on source-country income are forfeited when the income is
not taxed in the country of residence of the recipient entity but passes on to
a third-country resident.37
It is recommended in the OECD Commentary that all of the above
approaches be accompanied by "specific provisions to ensure that treaty
benefits will be granted in bona fide cases".38 Various bona fide provisions

The limitation on residence features in Art. 4 of the OECD Model. The article
34.
reads as follows:
"[ . . . ] the term 'resident of a Contracting State' means any person who, under the laws
of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of man
agement or any other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State and any
political subdivision or local authority thereof. This term, however, does not include any
person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of income from sources in that
State or capital situated therein. " (Emphasis added).
The exclusion approach denies treaty benefits to companies that are tax-exempt or
35.
nearly tax-exempt. A typical clause would read as follows:
"No provision of the Convention conferring an exemption from, or reduction of, tax shall
apply to income received or paid by a company as defined under section [ . . . ] of [ . . . ] the
Act, or under any similar provision enacted by [ . . . ] after signature of the Convention".
36.
General subject-to-tax provisions provide that source-country treaty benefits are
granted only if the respective income is subject to tax in the country of residence. The
subject-to-tax approach, although similar to the exclusion approach, is not confined to
tax exemptions or reductions in the country of residence. The OECD Model suggests a
more restrictive clause incorporating a safeguarding provision such as the following.
"Where income arising in a Contracting State is received by a company resident
of the other Contracting State and one or more persons not resident in that other
Contracting State:
(a) have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, wherever resident, a
substantial interest in such company, in the form of participation or otherwise, or
(b) exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the management or control of such
company, any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a reduc
tion of, tax shall apply only to income which is subject to tax in the last-mentioned State
under the ordinary rules of its tax law". (OECD Commentary, Para. 15).
37.
Panayi, Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty Shopping and the European
Community (2007), Chapter 2.
OECD Commentary to Art. 1, Para. 19.
38.
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were suggested in the OECD Conduit Companies Report39 and subsequently
added in the OECD Commentary to Art. 1 in July 1992.40
The 2003 OECD Commentary went further than its predecessors in
suggesting a comprehensive clause to deal with treaty shopping: the LOB
clause.41 The Commentary replicates the standard LOB clause found in the
US Model.
With the exception of the LOB, most of the OECD anti-treaty-shopping
provisions tend to be broad and vague, likely to generate interpretational
difficulties when applied in practice. This is hardly surprising, given the
definitional inadequacies and the lack of solid theoretical underpinnings
identified above.
Some recent cases on beneficial ownership illustrate these difficulties.42
Beneficial ownership is perhaps the most widely used anti-treaty-shopping
mechanism. However, the term is not defined in the OECD Model and most
tax treaties do not contain a definition of beneficial ownership.43 Moreover,
the term may not even have a domestic tax meaning. This creates uncer
tainty when trying to delineate who is the true beneficial owner of income
when treaty shopping concerns are raised.
Under the OECD Commentary, the term "is not used in a narrow technical
sense, rather, it should be understood in its context and in light of the object
and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance".44 In his authoritative trea
tise on tax treaties, Professor Philip Baker QC claims that "the 'beneficial
ownership' limitation is intended to exclude: (a) mere nominees or agents,
who are not treated as owners of the income in their country of residence;
(b) any other conduit who though the formal owner of the income, has very
narrow powers over the income which render the conduit a mere fiduciary

OECD Conduit Companies Report, Para. 42.
39.
40.
See van Weeghel, S., The Improper Use of Tax Treaties ( 1 998), p. 2 1 6.
OECD Commentary 2003, Para. 20.
41.
42.
See Sheppard, L., "Beneficial ownership too onerous?", Tax Analysts, WT D
176-4 ( l O September 2008).
43.
For exceptions, see Bernstein, J., "Beneficial Ownership: An international
perspective", 45 Tax Notes lnt'l (2007), p. 1 2 1 1 (p. 1 2 1 2).
44.
OECD Commentary to Art. 10, Para. 12. In other words, the limitation of source
country taxes by virtue of a tax treaty would not be available "when, economically,
it would benefit a person not entitled to it who interposed the conduit company as
an intermediary between himself and the payer of the income". See OECD Conduit
Companies Report, Para. 14(b).
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or administrator of the income on behalf of the beneficial owner. [T]he
mere fact that the recipient may be viewed as a conduit does not mean that
it is not the beneficial owner".45
Professor Baker argues that "the term [beneficial ownership] should be
accorded an 'international fiscal meaning' not derived from the domestic
laws of Contracting States". 46 The salience of the matter lies in determining
whether a company controlled by another one, and therefore likely but not
legally obliged to pay to its ultimate owner any sums received, is in fact the
beneficial owner of such sums.47
The difficulty of explaining the concept of "beneficial ownership" was
illustrated in the Indofood case.48 In Indofood, an Indonesian trading group
(lndofood) wanted to raise finance by issuing internationally marketed
interest-bearing notes to the public. This was done through a Mauritian
special purpose vehicle, in order to benefit from the reduced withholding
tax rate of the Indonesia-Mauritius tax treaty.49
Two years after the issue of the notes, the Indonesian Government decided to
terminate the Indonesia-Mauritius tax treaty. This meant that the Indonesian
withholding tax of 20% would have applied rather than the one under the
above tax treaty. Following this, Indofood tried to initiate the get-out clause
of the notes and gave notice to the trustee of the bondholders (JP Morgan) of
its intention to redeem early.50 The trustee refused to accept early redemp
tion on the basis that Indofood had not taken reasonable measures to prevent
this. According to the trustee, one such measure would have been the setting

45.
Baker, P., Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
2001), Paras. 10B-10.4.
46.
Id., Para. lOB-14.
47.
"As a practical approach, one can ask whose income the dividends (interest/
royalties) are in reality. One way to test this is to ask: what would happen if the recipient
went bankrupt before paying over the income to the intended, ultimate recipient? If the
ultimate recipient could claim the funds as its own, then the funds are properly regarded
as already belonging to the ultimate recipient. If, however, the ultimate recipient would
simply be one of the creditors of the actual recipient (if even that), then the funds prop
erly belong to the actual recipient." Id., Para. lOB- 15.
48. Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA (2006) EWCA
Civ 158.
49.
Had the notes been issued from Indonesia, a 20% withholding tax would have
been levied on interest. By raising the finance through the Mauritian subsidiary, the with
holding tax rate was reduced to 10%. There was no further withholding tax in Mauritius.
50.
Under the terms and conditions of the notes, Indofood was entitled to redeem
early on an adverse change of Indonesian law, if the effect of such adverse change could
not have been avoided by Indofood taking reasonable measures.
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up of a Dutch special purpose vehicle to perform the same function as the
Mauritian one, but using the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treatyY
The trustee initially succeeded at the High Court. 52 Indofood appealed. One
of the issues considered by the Court of Appeal was whether a newly inter
posed Dutch company would have been the beneficial owner of the inter
est payable by Indofood for the purposes of the Indonesia-Netherlands tax
treaty. The Court of Appeal decided the question of beneficial ownership in
favour of Indofood; i.e. the Dutch company could not be a beneficial owner
of the interest paid by Indofood. 53
After examining the OECD Commentary, the Court of Appeal confirmed
that the term "beneficial ownership" should be understood in its context and
in light of the object and purposes of the OECD Model; namely, the avoid
ance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.
The Court of Appeal cited Professor Baker's commentary approvingly. The
term "beneficial ownership" was to be given an international fiscal meaning
not derived from the domestic laws of contracting states.54
The Court of Appeal concluded that the concept of beneficial ownership
was incompatible with that of a formal owner who does not have "the
full privilege to directly benefit from the income".55 On the facts of the
case, looking at the legal, commercial and practical structure, neither
the Mauritian nor the suggested Dutch company could be perceived as
beneficial owners.56 Rather, they were mere administrators of the income.57
51.
According to this scenario, on payment of interest by Indofood, the funds would
have moved from Indofood, to the Dutch company, to the Mauritian company, to the
noteholders. The debt owed by Indofood to the Mauritian company would have been
novated to the Dutch company. In other words, when the Dutch company paid the inter
est to the Mauritian company, the Dutch company would be discharging a liability (the
novated debt) to that company.
The reason why the case was litigated in English courts was because there was a
52.
"governing law" clause providing to that effect.
As a corollary, the setting up of a Dutch company was not a reasonable measure
53.
that Indofood could have undertaken to avoid the adverse consequences from the change
of law.
lndofood v. JP Morgan (2006), Para. 42 (Lord Justice Chadwick).
54.
55.
ld., Para. 42.
56.
In Para. 42, Lord Justice Chadwick pointed out that the fact that neither the
Mauritian nor the suggested Dutch company were or could be a trustee, agent or nominee
for the noteholders or anyone else in relation to the interest received from Indofood was
"by no means conclusive". Nor was the absence of any entitlement of a noteholder to
security over the interest received from Indofood. However, in his subsequent analysis,
beneficial ownership was dismissed.
57.
Id., Para. 44.
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Following this decision, in a guidance note issued on 9 October 2006,58
Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs (HMRC) confirmed that the Court
of Appeal 's decision was consistent with existing HMRC policy. HMRC
found that the decision was binding insofar as it related to construing
beneficial ownership in the context of the United Kingdom 's tax treaties.
Therefore, the international fiscal meaning of beneficial ownership and the
test of full privilege to directly benefit from the income are considered to
be applicable in the UK context. This test has been criticized in the United
Kingdom as being too limited.59
Reading this case, it appears that the Court of Appeal focused more on
what the intermediate entity does or can do with the income, i.e. its narrow
powers, rather than anything. The Court seems to have applied a technical
test. Rather than look at the overall substance of the scheme and effec
tively the end-result, the Court emphasized the specific payment and cash
flow arrangements60 and how those affected the economic credibility of the
intermediate entity.
In the Bank of Scotland61 case, the French Supreme Administrative Court
followed a similar approach. Here, a US parent concluded a usufruct
agreement 62 with a UK bank. Under this usufruct agreement, the UK bank
acquired for a three-year period fixed dividend coupons attached to the
(non-voting preferred) shares of the French subsidiary of the US parent

58.
Available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/updates/intmupdate I 01007.
htm.
59.
See, for example, Fraser, R., and J.D.B. Oliver, "Treaty Shopping and Beneficial
Ownership: Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London
Branch", BTR 4 (2006), 422-426; Mehta, N.V. and K. Habershon, "U.K. Tax Authorities
Issue Draft Guidance in Wake of Indofood Decision", Doc 2006-22678 or 2006 WTD
216-2; Kandev, M., "Beneficial Ownership: Indofood Run Wild", CCH Tax Topics
No. 1812 (30 November 2006), p. 1; Baker, P., "Beneficial Owner: After Indofood",
VI Grays Inn Tax Chamber Review 1, (2007), p. 15; Mehta, N.Y. and K. Habershon, Doc
2006-22678 or 2006 WTD 216-2; Bundgaard, J. and N. Winther-S!i!rensen, "Beneficial
Ownership in International Financing Structures", 50 Tax Notes Int'/7 (2008), p. 587.
60.
Two business days before the due date for the payment of interest to the notehold
ers, Indofood was to pay the Mauritian subsidiary. One business day before the due date,
the Mauritian subsidiary was to pay the paying agent. On the due date, the paying agent
was to pay the noteholders.
61.
Conseil d'Etat, 29 December 2006, Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de
l'Industrie c/Societe Bank of Scotland, No. 283314; Revue de Droit Fiscal No. 4/2007,
p. 34, Sec. 87. See Sheppard, L., "Indofood and Bank of Scotland: Who Is the Beneficial
Owner?", 45 Tax Notes Int'l 5 (2007), p. 406; HJI Panayi, C., "Recent Developments to
the OECD Model Tax Treaty and EC Law", 47 European Taxation 10 (2007), p. 452.
62.
A usufruct is a civil law concept. It is the legal right to use and derive profit or ben
efit from property that belongs to another person, as long as the property is not damaged.
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company. The usufruct contract was structured in such a way that the UK
bank, in fact, undertook very little risk of default.63
The French company later on distributed dividends to the bank which were
subject to a 25% withholding tax. Under Art. 9 of the applicable France
UK tax treaty, the maximum withholding tax was 15%. The tax treaty also
provided for a transfer of the avoirfiscal tax credit. The UK bank requested
a refund of the French withholding tax levied in excess of the maximum
rate of 15% and the avoir fiscal tax credit as provided by the tax treaty.
The French tax administration rejected the claim on the basis that the
beneficial owner of the dividend distribution was not the UK bank but the
US parent. The case ended up in the Supreme Administrative Court, which
agreed with the tax administration, in that the transaction implemented
by the contracting parties in reality concealed a loan agreement between
the UK bank and the US parent which was remunerated by the payment
of the avoir fiscal tax credit to the UK bank. The Supreme Administrative
Court concentrated on the fact that the price paid by the UK bank to the US
parent to acquire the dividend coupons corresponded to the amount of the
dividends, before the levying of withholding tax. The beneficial owner of the
dividends was, in fact, the US parent. The US parent merely delegated to its
French subsidiary the repayment of the loan contracted with the UK bank.
Again, although the Supreme Administrative Court looked at the overall
scheme, in its analysis, it focused on specific elements, such as the payment
arrangement and the question of risk. What was crucial to the French tax
administration and to the Supreme Administrative Court was the fact that
the return to the UK bank was pre-determined and guaranteed. A possible
default of the French subsidiary would not have affected the UK bank. All
these factors pointed to a loan rather than the usufruct agreement described
by the parties.
A similarly factual approach was followed in the Prevost case.64 Here, a
Netherlands company (Prevost Holding) was owned 49% by a UK company

The US parent had guaranteed the return and agreed to indemnify the UK bank
63.
against government failure to refund the avoir fiscal. The amount of tbe dividends was
also predetermined. In addition, tbe usufruct contract contained an acceleration clause
entitling the UK bank to sell the shares back to tbe US parent on a change in the appli
cable tax law.
64.
Kandev, M. "Prevost Car: Canada's First Word on Beneficial Ownership", 50 Tax
Notes Int'l 7 (2008), p. 526; Summerhill, L., J. Bernstein and B. Womdl, "Taxpayer
Prevails in Canadian Beneficial Ownership Case", 50 Tax Notes Int'l 5 (2008), p. 363;
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(Henlys) and 5 1% by a Swedish company (Volvo). Volvo had acquired
all the shares of a Canadian company (Prevost) in 1 995 and immediately
thereafter transferred them to Prevost Holding. Volvo then sold 49% of its
shares in Prevost Holding to Henlys. Prevost paid around CAD 80 million
of dividends to Prevost Holding in the 1996 to 1 999 and 2001 tax years.
The Canadian tax authorities withheld tax at 5%. Prevost Holding was
not subject to Netherlands tax on dividends from Prevost because of the
Netherlands participation exemption.
Under the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty, the 5% rate applied if the
dividend recipient was a company that owned at least 25% of the capital or
at least 10% of the voting power in the company paying the dividends.65 The
Canadian tax authorities refused to allow the application of the Canada
Netherlands tax treaty by maintaining that Prevost Holding was not the
beneficial owner of the dividends received from Prevost. This was because
Prevost Holding did not have any office, assets, activities or employees in
the Netherlands, its only asset consisted of the shares in Prevost and all its
expenses were paid by its shareholders. The dividends paid by Prevost were
treated as if they had been paid to Henlys and Volvo directly. As a result,
49% of the dividends were subject to tax at the 10% rate of the Canada-UK
tax treaty and 5 1% of the dividends were subject to tax at the 15% rate of
the Canada-Sweden tax treaty. 66
The taxpayer objected to this treatment, arguing that Prevost Holding was
entitled to the benefits of the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty. The taxpayer
also argued that this company structure was a common form of business
structure where two or more companies pooled their resources to carry on a
joint business and that the structure did not have any unusual or tax-driven
aspects.

Kandev, M.N. and B. Wiener, "Some thoughts on the Use of Later OECD Commentaries
After Prevost Car", 54 Tax Notes lnt'l 8 (2009), p. 667; Panayi, 47 European Taxation
10 (2007), p. 452; Holderman, S., " Tour d'Horizon of the Term 'Beneficial Owner"',
54 Tax Notes /nt'/1 0 (2009), p. 8 8 1 ; Krishna, V., "Using Beneficial Ownership to Prevent
Treaty Shopping", 56 Tax Notes /nt'/7 (2009), p. 537; Bernstein, J. and L. Summerhill,
"Canadian Court Respects Dutch Holding Company", WTD 43-2 (9 March 2009),
Doc 2009-4953.
Art. 10(2) Netherlands-Canada tax treaty.
65.
66.
The Canadian tax authorities initially applied the 5% rate under Art. 10(2)(a) of
the Canada-Sweden tax treaty for certain years, but then revised the rate to 15% in a
subsequent reassessment. Art. 10(2)(a) of the Canada-Sweden tax treaty provides for
a 5% rate if the beneficial owner of the dividend is a company that directly controls at
least 10% of the voting power of the dividend payer or directly holds at least 25% of
its capital.
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The Tax Court of Canada67 and later on the Federal Court of Appeal68
agreed with the taxpayer in that Prevost Holding was the beneficial owner
of the dividends. The Federal Court of Appeal concurred with the judg
ment of Chief Justice Rip of the Tax Court in that the beneficial owner of
dividends is the person who receives the dividends for his or her own use
and enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the dividend he or she
received. 69
"Where an agency or mandate exists or the property is in the name of a
nominee, one looks to find on whose behalf the agent or mandatary is act
ing or for whom the nominee has lent his or her name. When corporate
entities are concerned, one does not pierce the corporate veil unless the
corporation is a conduit for another person and has absolutely no discre
tion as to the use or application of funds put through it as conduit, or has
agreed to act on someone else 's behalf pursuant to that person's instruc
tions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for
example, a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the shares it holds
for clients."70
The relationship between Prevost Holding and its shareholders was not one
of agency, or mandate. Prevost Holding was not a conduit for Volvo and
Henlys and could not be said to have absolutely no discretion as to the use
or application of funds put through it as a conduit. The Courts reasoned as
follows.
There was no predetermined or automatic flow of funds to Volvo and
Henlys. Prevost Holding's Deed of Incorporation did not obligate it to
pay any dividends to its shareholders. In fact, Henlys and Volvo could not
take action against Prevost Holding for failure to pay dividends. Prevost
Holding was the registered owner of Prevost shares, paid for the shares
and owned the shares for itself. When dividends were received by Prevost
Holding in respect of shares it owned, the dividends were the property of
Prevost Holding and were available to its creditors, if any, until such time as
the management board declared a dividend and the dividend was approved
by the shareholders.71

Prevost Car Inc. v. The Queen , 2008 TCC 23 1 (22 April 2008). Judgment by the
67.
Associate Chief Justice Rip.
Prevost Car Inc. v. T he Queen, 2009 FCA 57 (26 February 2009).
68.
Id., Para. 13, citing Para. 100 in 2008 TCC 23 1 .
69.
ld.
70.
Id., Para. 1 6 , citing Paras. 100-105 in 2008 TCC 23 1 .
71.
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Therefore, Prevost Holding, being the beneficial owner of the dividends,
was entitled to the benefit of the reduced rate of tax on dividends under the
Canada-Netherlands tax treaty.
Broadly, in this case, the real powers of the intermediary company and its
relationship with the parent company were crucial. The courts focused on
the governance model of the intermediary company, its actual management
and the composition of its parent company's board. The ownership of the
income received, the discretion to use, enjoy and dispose of it, as well as
issues of risk and control, were addressed.
As in Indofood, the arrangement was not to be dismantled. Of course,
the difference between the two cases is that in Indofood, a finding of
no beneficial ownership of an intermediary (which ought to have been
inserted, according to the trustee of the bondholder) protected the existing
arrangement and enabled Jndofood to redeem the notes early. By contrast,
in Prevost, a finding of beneficial ownership of the intermediary protected
the arrangement and the reduced withholding taxes of the underlying tax
treaties applied.
However, in all of the above cases, the courts seem to have proceeded on
an ad hoc and factual basis. The existence (or lack of) beneficial owner
ship was to be considered on the facts of each case, taking into account
some of the factors mentioned above (ownership, risk, discretion, etc.) in
a non-exhaustive manner. Whilst clear cases of abuse/sham may have been
easily detected, there was no bright-line test for the less abusive but still
to an extent contrived situations. Much depended on how national courts
perceived and interpreted beneficial ownership in their own jurisdictions,
independently of judicial precedents in other jurisdictions.
As a result of the lack of bright-line tests and the ad hoc application of ben
eficial ownership, taxpayers are faced with uncertainty when structuring
arrangements that are akin to treaty shopping arrangements. Furthermore,
the threshold test of business legitimacy with which the intermediary is
to be imbued so as not to be part of a treaty shopping arrangement may
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In other words, the benchmark of
impropriety may shift with time and with location. This is hardly surpris
ing, given the theoretical limitations of the treaty shopping polemic.
Neither does the United States seem to display a more uniform and coher
ent approach to treaty shopping. This is examined below.
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3.2. The US approach to treaty shopping

The United States was the first country to advance objections to treaty shop
ping.72 It remains the most vocal opponent to such practices. The Technical
Explanation of the US Model, which describes treaty shopping, contains
an unequivocal statement in that "tax treaties should include provisions
that specifically prevent misuse of treaties by residents of third countries".73
Historically, however, the US attitude to treaty shopping had not always
been so hostile. In fact, initially, the US fisc showed no particular concern
over treaty shopping. After World War II, the US international tax policy
focused on outbound rather than inbound investment. Its fiscal interests,
mainly the minimization of foreign (source country) taxes imposed on US
legal entities, were clearly influenced by its concerns as a country of resi
dence. Therefore, treaty shopping was not a controversial issue in treaty
negotiations as it worked to the advantage of the US fisc. If less tax was
paid abroad by US persons, then less foreign tax credit depleting the US
coffers was paid to such persons.
In the 1980s, the transition from being a major country of residence to
a country of source had begun. The US administration concentrated its
initiatives on attracting foreign capital, in order to help finance domestic
investment. Inter alia, it exempted portfolio gains from taxation to
encourage foreigners to invest in the US markets,74 rendering the US "a
sort of tax haven for foreign portfolio investment".75 At the same time, it
tried to discourage outbound investment.76 Gradually, the country became
the word's largest debtor with a huge trade deficit. Therefore, the US fisc
became increasingly concerned with reduction of source taxes via treaty
shopping. Treaty shopping was not only disliked because it caused an

72.
In fact, most of the literature mentioned in 2.2. above originates in the United
States. See, for example, Rosenbloom and Langbein, 19 Colum. J. Transnational Law
(1981), pp. 396-7; Reinhold, 53 Tax Lawyer 3 (2000), p. 663; Oliva, R., "The Treasury's
Twenty Year Battle with Treaty Shopping: Art. 16 of the 1977 United States Model
Treaty", 14 Ga. J. Int'l & Camp. L. (1984), p. 293.
See Technical Explanation on Art. 22 of US Model.
73.
See Foreign Investors Tax Act (1966).
74.
Haug, S.M., "The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty Shopping
75.
Provisions: A Comparative Analysis", 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
(1996), p. 191 (p. 239).
76.
See Interest Equalisation Tax Act (1964) which restricted portfolio investment by
US persons in long-term debt obligations of foreign issuers.
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untoward erosion of source-based taxation. It was also objectionable as it
often involved tax havens.
The United States had no limitation on treaty shopping until l 984, although
certain cases limited the use of treaties in abusive situations. In Aiken
Industries , the Tax Court held that the reduction of withholding tax under
the US-Honduras treaty did not apply to back-to-back loans with identical
interest payments between a US payer, a related Honduras corporation, and
the Bahamas parent corporation. The court held that the treaty required that
the recipient of the payment have "dominion and control" over the funds
and that this requirement was not met when the Honduran corporation was
a mere conduit. 77
In 1984, the United States terminated the extension of its treaty with the
Netherlands to the Netherlands Antilles, which was used by many US
corporations as the location of finance subsidiaries that borrowed on the
Eurobond market and onlent the funds to the US parent. At the same time,
the IRS issued two Revenue Rulings applying the precedent of Aiken
Industries even to situations where there is a "spread" between the two
loans or when one payment is interest and the other a dividend.78
Subsequently, the United States began to incorporate LOB provisions
first into the Internal Revenue Code and then into treaties. In 1986, the
branch profit tax provision was adopted with a "qualified resident" defini
tion that overrode treaties. 79 The US-Germany treaty from 1989 was the
first to include an LOB provision, and all subsequent US treaties include
LOB provisions, so that now there are almost no US treaties without such
provisions.
In addition, in 1993 Congress authorized the IRS to adopt regulations
involving "conduit arrangements" in multiple-party financing transac
tions.80 The regulations adopted by the IRS follow the 1 984 rulings and
apply to a wide range of financing transactions, and they also constitute a
treaty override.81

77.
Aiken Industries v. Inc Commissioner , 56 TC 925 ( 197 1).
Rev. Rul. 84- 153, 1984-2 CB 383; Rev. Rul. 84- 152, 1 984-2 CB 381; see also
78.
Rev. Rul. 85-163, 1 985-2 CB 349 and Rev Rul 89- 1 10, 1989-2 CB 275.
79.
IRC 884(e), 884(f)(3).
80.
IRC 7701(1).
81.
Treas. Reg. 1 .881 -3.

42

Responses to treaty shopping: The OECD and the United States

It is not clear to what extent these provisions are effective to prevent treaty
shopping. For example, in the period between 1997 and 2001 many public
US corporations engaged in "inversion" transactions in which they became
subsidiaries of new public corporations in Bermuda. Bermuda does not
have a treaty with the United States so for treaty purposes the new parent
corporations qualified as residents of Barbados. Subsequently, the new par
ent would lend funds to the US subsidiary which would deduct the interest
and pay no withholding tax under the Barbados treaty. The LOB provi
sion in the treaty proved ineffective because it does not apply to public
corporations (even though the corporation was traded in New York, not in
Barbados).
The ambiguity as to what is treaty shopping and as such improper use
of tax treaties and what is mere tax planning and as such legitimate is
reflected in the case law. US case law since Aiken Industries has tended
not to side with the IRS even in situations which clearly involved treaty
shopping.
For example, in Northern Indiana Public Utilities the Court of Appeals
rejected the IRS' attempt to apply a substance over form or economic
substance analysis to a Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiary.82 In SDI
Industries the Tax Court rejected the IRS attempt to argue that when a
Netherlands corporation licensed software from its Netherlands Antilles
subsidiary and sublicensed it to a US affiliate, neither the royalty payments
from the United States to the Netherlands nor from the Netherlands to the
Antilles were subject to US withholding tax. 83
Recent US treaties (e.g. with the Netherlands and Switzerland) include
elaborate LOB provisions that are much more complex than the provision
in the 2006 US Model. These provisions were generally negotiated by the
other side to the treaty and indicate that despite the professed US hostility to
all forms of treaty shopping and its insistence on including LOB provisions
in all new US treaties, in practice these provisions can be negotiated to
address the concerns of the treaty partner and create opportunities for tax
planning.
Therefore, the US approach to treaty shopping is, to an extent, also
beleaguered by lack of uniformity. Even the LOBs in its tax treaty network

Northem lndiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner; 1 15 F.3d506(7th Cir. 1997).
82.
SDI Netherlands v. Commissioner , 107 TC 161 (1996). The case was decided for
83.
a tax year before there was an LOB provision in the Netherlands treaty.
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show variable degrees of severity which may exonerate a range of arrange
ments. This approach seems to be perpetuated in recent US tax treaties.
Overall, as far as treaty shopping is concerned, we identify variable stan
dards and shifting benchmarks of impropriety. What are the implications
of this conclusion in the EU context? This is examined in the final part of
this paper.

4. Treaty shopping and EU law

In this section, we consider the effect of EU law on treaty shopping and
anti-treaty-shopping provisions. In the past few years, the compatibility
of anti-treaty-shopping provisions with EU law has been a topic of intense
debate. It has been argued that anti-treaty-shopping provisions and espe
cially the LOB are in breach of the freedom of establishment and/or the free
movement of capital.84 May Member States include anti-treaty-shopping
provisions in tax treaties between themselves or with non-EU Member
States?
For this argument to succeed, it has to be shown that treaty shopping, i.e.
the activity that these anti-abuse provisions seek to curb, is an activity pro
tected under EU law. Of course, there has to be genuine (cross-border)
activity; the more abusive the structure, the less likely that the fundamental
freedoms will be triggered at all. For, if the intermediary entity is a com
plete sham, then, arguably, there is no genuine exercise of establishment in
that jurisdiction nor is there any movement of capital. Therefore, the more
economic substance there is in the intermediary company itself, the more
likely that the setting up of the establishment itself will be recognized as an

84.
See, for example, HJI Panayi, C., "Open Skies for EC Tax?", BTR 3 (2 003),
p. 189; Kofler, G. W., "European Taxation Under an 'Open Sky': LoB Clauses in Tax
Treaties Between the U.S. and the EU Member States", 35 Tax Notes International
1(2 004), p. 45; Hinnekens, L., "Compatibility of Bilateral Tax Treaties with European
Community Law - The Rules", EC Tax Review 4 ( 1994), p. 146; Hinnekens, L.,
"Compatibility of Bilateral Tax Treaties with European Community Law- Application of
the Rules", EC Tax Review 4 ( 1995), p. 2 02; Doyle, H., "Is Article 2 6 of the Netherlands
United States Tax Treaty Compatible With EC Law?", 35 European Taxation l ( 1996),
p. 14; Martin-Jimenez, A.J., "EC Law and Clauses on 'Limitation of Benefit s' in Treaties
with the U.S. after Maastricht and the U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty", EC Tax Review
2 ( 1995), p. 78; Anders, D., "The Limitation on Benefits Clause of the U.S.-German
Tax Treaty and Its Compatibility With European Union Law", 18 Nw. J. lnt'l L. &
Bus. ( 1997), p. 165; Essers/de Bont/Kemmeren (eds.) The Compatibility of Anti-Abuse
Provisions in Tax Treaties with EC Law (The Hague: Kluwer international, 1998).
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activity that could be prima facie covered by the freedom of establishment.
Similarly, the more economic substance there is in the intermediary, the
more likely that investment through it will be prima facie covered by the
free movement of capital.
Assuming this first threshold issue is satisfied and the aforementioned fun
damental freedoms are prima facie engaged, is there a restriction to them?
From a freedom of establishment perspective, it could be argued that treaty
shopping, i.e. the use of the intermediary entity located in a favourable tax
jurisdiction to effect the investment, is an exercise of freedom of estab
lishment. The possibility that the intermediary entity has limited economic
substance (but is short of a complete sham for threshold purposes) ought
not prevent this from being characterized as an exercise of establishment.
An analogy may be drawn with a line of non-tax related cases (Centros85/
Uberseering86). These cases dealt with corporate forum shopping. Here, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) approved the formation of primary and
secondary establishments, even if they lacked economic substance in one
Member State and were thought to have been set up in order to circumvent
the company law formation requirements applicable in another Member
State.87 Just because the undertaking was corporate forum shopping within
the European Union with little economic substance in the establishment
did not necessarily mean that the protection under the freedom of establish
ment was withdrawn. Can this strand of reasoning also apply with treaty
shopping? Does the fact that treaty shopping entails tax-location shopping
rather than corporate forum shopping change matters?
There is no reason why it should, at least prima facie. It could be argued that
treaty shopping is an exercise of establishment, regardless of the motives
behind it. What anti-treaty-shopping provisions tend to do is to disregard
the intermediary entity and treat another company as the ultimate recipi
ent of the income. Therefore, it could be argued that anti-treaty-shopping
provisions restrict the freedom of establishment. Of course, this restriction
could be justified, as explained below, but this is nonetheless a restriction.

ECJ 9 March 1999, C-212/97, Centros [ 1 999] ECR 1-1459.
85.
ECJ 5 November 2002, C-208/00, Oberseering [2002] ECR 1-9919.
86.
For recent analysis, see HJI Panayi, C., "Corporate Mobility under Private
87.
International Law and European Community Law: Debunking Some Myths", in
Eeckhout(Tridimas (eds.) Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 28 (Oxford. Oxford
University Press, 2009), p. 124.
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From a free movement of capital perspective, it could be argued that a
treaty shopper exercises its free movement of capital by investing in a com
pany indirectly (i.e. through another Member State entity) and as a result
receiving its return from such investment indirectly. The analysis here
focuses on the existence (or lack of) indirect investment rather than the use
of an intermediary entity. The issue is not so much the fact of establishing
a related entity through which investment is made. What is important is the
fact that the treaty shopper (whether EU national or not) takes advantage
of the tax treaty network of another Member State in order to invest in a
third Member State, by channelling income through an intermediary entity
which it does not control.
In other words, this is an instance of indirect rather than direct investment
(investment through a related entity) and as such, prima facie protected
under the free movement of capital. Anti-treaty-shopping provisions tend
to disregard the intermediary entity and/or re-characterize the payment as
being directly made to another company. As a result, they may ultimately
make the investment of capital through an intermediary in another Member
State more expensive. Therefore, it could be argued that anti-treaty
shopping provisions restrict the free movement of capital.
Of course, as under freedom of establishment, this restriction could be
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest. It also has to
be suitable and proportional.88 Not every kind of structure will ultimately
be protected under EU law.
For example, the restriction could be justified on the basis of preventing
tax avoidance/evasion.89 In order for this ground to succeed, the anti-treaty
shopping provisions must have the specific purpose of preventing wholly
artificial arrangements.90 Broad anti-abuse clauses which do not distin
guish between bona fide activities and abusive situations have been struck

88.
ECJ 30 November 1995, C-55/94, Gebhard [1995] ECR 1-4165, Para. 37.
89.
See, for example, ECJ 16 July 1998, C-264/96, ICI [ 1 998] ECR 1-4695; ECJ 1 1
March 2004, C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministere de L'Economie des
Finances et de l'lndustrie [2004] ECR I-02409. The ECJ tends to use the terms "avoid
ance" and "evasion" without distinction. In some cases, it refers to the justification as
being based on tax avoidance (e.g. ECJ 16 July 1998, C-264/96, IC/, Para. 26), whereas
in others (usually more recent ones), it referred to tax evasion (e.g. ECJ 1 2 December
2002, C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, Para. 37; ECJ 2 1 November 2002, C-436/00, X and
Y, Para. 62).
90.
ECJ 21 November 2002, C-264/96, ICI, Para. 26; ECJ 12 December 2002,
C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst, Para. 37.
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down.91 Prevention of tax avoidance/evasion could, therefore, exonerate a
restrictive treaty provision if this is sufficiently targeted to that end. The
provision must also be suitable and must not go beyond what is necessary
to attain the objective pursued, whether this is prevention of tax evasion or
tax avoidance.
Therefore, if less than wholly artificial arrangements are caught by an anti
treaty-shopping provision, then the restriction is unlikely to be justified. As
a corollary, the more artificial the treaty-shopping arrangement, the more
likely it is to have tax avoidance connotations - against which an anti
treaty-shopping provision can more readily be justified. It should be noted
that obtaining a mere tax saving is not tax avoidance/evasion in the eyes of
the ECJ.92 Loss of revenue and erosion of tax base has not been accepted
as a justification by the ECJ.93 In any case, as explained above,94 treaty
shopping has not unequivocally proved to be fiscally harmful.
The restriction could also be justified on the basis of safeguarding the
allocation of tax jurisdiction.95 It could be argued that what anti-treaty
shopping provisions seek to do is restore the allocation choices of the tax
treaty shopped. If State S wanted to grant the same tax concessions to State
P and State R, it would have done so. As the original allocation choices of
the relevant tax treaties are respected under EU law after the D. case,96 so
should measures to protect and restore those allocation choices.
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See 12 December 2002, C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst, Paras. 34-38;
ECJ I I March 2004, C-9/02, Lasteyrie du Saillant , Para. 50.
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ECR I-7447, Para. 44 and other cases cited therein.
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ECJ 21 September 1999, C-307/97, Saint-Gobain [ 1 999] ECR I-6 1 6 1 , Para. 50;
ECJ 12 December 2002, C-385/00 De Groot [2002] ECR I-1 1 819, Para. 103.
94.
See 2.2. and the analysis on Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan [2003]6
ITLR 233; (2003) SOL 6 19.
95.
See Case ECJ 5 July 2005, C-376/03, D [2005] ECR I-5821 ; ECJ 13 December
2005, C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837; ECJ 18 July 2007, C-23 1/05,
OyAA [2007] ECR I-6373; ECJ 7 September 2006, C-470/04, N [2006] ECR I-74091;
ECJ 15 May 2008, C-414/06, Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co KG/Finanzamt Heilbronn
[2008] ECR I-3601 , Para. 5 1 ; ECJ 1 7 September 2009, C-1 82/08, Glaxo Wellcome
GmbH & Co. KG v. Finanzamt Miinchen II, Para. 88.
In the D case, the ECJ accepted the allocation attained in the relevant tax treaties,
96.
even if this meant that some non-residents were treated more harshly than other non
residents. The ECJ found that the Netherlands was not obliged to extend to a German
resident the treaty benefits given to Belgian residents. The Germany-Netherlands tax
treaty did not provide for the same allowances as the Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty.
This was a question of pre-agreed allocation of tax powers between these States. The
relevant treaties were not to be interfered with by extending benefits given to Belgian
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Certainly, the application of this justification has to be finely tuned
and proportional. The allocation of tax jurisdiction is less threatened
by intermediary entities imbued with economic substance. The more
substance there is in the treaty shopping arrangement, the less likely that
the allocation scheme under the underlying tax treaty would be frustrated.
Anti-treaty-shopping provisions have to factor that in.
Also, the applicability of this ground as an imperative requirement could
depend on the actual effect of the anti-treaty-shopping provisions on the
structure. Do they restore the original withholding tax rate that would have
applied absent the treaty shopping arrangement or do they impose a (penal)
statutory withholding tax rate? If the former, then it could be argued that
what the anti-treaty-shopping provision actually does is to restore the treaty
balance. However, if the statutory withholding tax rate applies, then it is
more difficult to see how the anti-treaty-shopping provision restores the
treaty balance, since that balance is itself overridden.
A point to note is that under the free movement of capital, it does not matter
whether the capital movement is to or from a non-Member State, so long
as there is some capital movement to or from a Member State. However,
this could be relevant at the justification stage.97 A restriction may be more
readily justified if it affects third-country nationals than if it affects EU
nationals. Nevertheless, this has to be proven. Another point to note is that
the freedom of establishment is only available to EU nationals. Therefore,
if the intermediary entity is in a non-EU Member State, then ari anti-treaty-

residents also to German residents. The current tendency of the ECJ seems to be
respect for the allocation choices enshrined in tax treaties. See, for example, ECJ 1 5
May 2008, C-414/06, Lidl Belgium [2008] ECR 1-360 1 , Para. 5 1 ; ECJ 1 7 September
2009, C-182/08, Glaxo Wellcome GmbH & Co. KG v. Finanzamt Miinchen II, Para. 88.
The only case which explicitly dealt with anti-treaty-shopping provisions is the ACT
Group Litigation case. Here, both the Advocate General and the ECJ refrained from
using tax treaty allocation as a justification for a restriction. Instead, reliance was placed
on non-comparability. However, the overtone of both the Opinion and the judgment is
respect for tax treaties. The tax treaty package represented an equilibrium, into which
no enquiries could have been sustained. ECJ 1 2 December 2006, C-374/04, ACT Group
Litigation, Paras. 88-91. For further analysis, see Chapter 5 in HJI Panayi, C., Double
Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty Shopping and the European Community (2007).
97.
See, for example, ECJ 1 2 December 2006, C-446/04, FII Group Litigation case
[2006] ECR 1-1 1753, Paras. 169-172; ECJ 13 March 2007, C-524/04 T hin Cap Group
Litigation [2007] ECR 1-2107; ECJ 1 8 December 2007, C-101/05 Case A [2007] ECR
1-1 153 1 ; ECJ 23 April 2008, C-201/05 T he Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend
Group Litigation v. HMRC [2008] STC 1 5 1 3; ECJ 19 November 2009, C-540/07
Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I-0000.
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shopping provision frustrating the arrangement may not be incompatible
with EU law.
conclusion, it is possible that anti-treaty-shopping provisions restrict the
freedom of establishment and/or the free movement of capital. However,
they could be justified, depending on how these provisions are phrased,
whether they are sufficiently targeted against wholly artificial arrange
ments and proportional. It also depends on whether these provisions try to
curb treaty shopping through a non-EU Member State.
In

The recent trend, however, at the ECJ level appears to be respect for the
allocation of taxing rights under a tax treaty and, generally, respect for tax
treaties.

5. Conclusion

The first author has repeatedly stated his belief that an underlying principle
of the international tax regime is the single tax principle, i.e. that cross
border flows of income should be subject to some tax and that double non
taxation should be addressed as much as double taxation.98 The rationale
is that double non-taxation weakens countries ' ability to tax income by
encouraging shifting income from domestic to cross-border activities. This
view implies that reduction of tax by the source country should be premised
on actual taxation by the residence country.
There is no question that this view was not always taken by any country;
the first US tax treaty ( 1 937) was with France at a time when the US system
was purely territorial so that reduction of source taxation was not accom
panied by residence taxation. However, the introduction of LOB provisions
into US tax treaties and into the OECD Commentary indicate that this view
is gaining ground and it may apply even in situations that are not purely
abusive.
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that actual treaty practice and case law
fall far short of implementing the single tax principle. In most cases anti
treaty shopping provisions are either absent or applied only to pure con
duit situations. This may reflect the unclear theoretical basis to the attack
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Avi-Yonah, R.S., International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the
International Tax Regime, Cambridge Tax Law Series (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), Chapter 10.

49

Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the European Union

on treaty shopping in general, or (as in the India/Mauritius case) practical
constraints stemming from tax competition. In any case, this debate is
likely to continue.
As far as treaty shopping within the European Union is concerned, special
considerations would seem to apply. If anti-treaty-shopping provisions are
targeted against wholly artificial arrangements, then it is more likely that
they will be compatible with EU law. However, as was shown in section 3 . ,
anti-treaty-shopping provisions may not be targeted against such arrange
ments only. In fact, provisions such as beneficial ownership can be so
vague that they can be subject to different interpretations, catching a wider
or narrower array of arrangements in each jurisdiction. Whilst a wholly
artificial arrangement may be more easily found when double non-taxation
is in place, anti-treaty-shopping provisions are not always applied to that
effect. Therefore, EU Member States should re-examine their tax treaty
policies, to ensure that EU law safeguards are reflected in the application
and interpretation of their anti-treaty-shopping provisions.
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